Border Security Force (BSF) with 257,363
personnel in 186 battalions; Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) with 313,678
personnel in 245 battalions (including RAF and COBRA Unit); Central Industrial
Security Force (CISF) with 144,418 personnel in 132 battalions; Indo-Tibetan
Border Police (ITBP) with 89,432 personnel in 62 battalions; National Security
Guard (NSG) with 7,350 personnel, Assam Riffles (AR) with 63,747 personnel in
46 battalions; and, Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) with 76,337 personnel in 67 battalions,
are not Indian Army. They do not come
under Ministry of Defence. They are in
no way connected with the Armed Forces of India except for some joint operation
or close cooperation in a given mission. These 7 are collectively called Central Armed
Police Forces (CAPF), f/k/a Paramilitary Forces and are organized with the primary role of - border
guarding for BSF (Indo-Pakistan, Indo-Myanmar and India-Bangladesh), ITBP
(Indo-China), SSB (Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan); Security of sensitive establishments
by CISF, Assisting Police to tackle Law & Order, Counter-Terrorist
Operations, Counter Naxal Operations by CRPF, NSG. Apart from the primary role,
all CAPFs are involved in assisting Police in Law & Order situations and
also Army in Counter-Terrorist Operations. BSF & CRPF have assisted the
army during external aggression in the past. CAPFs work along with both Army
& Police in different roles assigned to them. They are Organised Group “A”
Central Police force.
ABOUT BSF and BSF ACT
The Border Security Force formally raised on 1
December 1965, is over four decades old, and the largest paramilitary
organisation in the world. The North Bengal
Frontier of the BSF covers the North Bengal Districts of Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri,
Uttar Dinajpur, Dakshin Dinajpur, Darjeeling, Kishanganj. Inspector General Siliguri with its office at
Kadamtala, Siliguri, Dist Darjeeling is the Head of the North Bengal Frontier. The North Bengal Frontier has the
responsibility of manning the International Bangladesh Border across the
Districts of Jalpaiguri, Uttar Dinajpur, Dakshin Dinajpur, Darjeeling, Kishanganj. There are 8 sectors along the Border in West
Bengal out of which Sector Head Quarter at Cooch Behar (SHQ Sonari), Sector
Head Quarter at Siliguri (SHQ Kadamtala), and, Sector Head Quarter at Jalpaiguri
(SHQ Raninagar), falls within North Bengal. There are 204 functional BOPs (Border Out
Posts) in North Bengal. The Personnel
and Officers of the BSF are governed by the Border Security Force Act, 1969 and
the Rules framed thereunder [Border Security Force Rule, 1969; BSF (Tenure of
posting and deputation ) Rules 2000; and, Border Security force (Ceremonials
And Marks of Respect) Rules, 1989].
The Border Security Force Act, 1969, divided into
10 Chapters and 142 Sections is a complete code for constitution of the force
and conditions of service of the members of the force. Chapter III of the Border Security Force Act,
1969 provides for offences and Chapter IV for Punishments and Penalties in
respect of the Offences mentioned in Chapter III. The Act provides for establishment of
Security Force Court [(a) General Security Force Courts; (b) Petty Security
Force Courts; and (c) Summary Security Force Courts] under Chapter VI of the Border
Security Force Act, 1969. A General
Security Force Court, which consists of Five or more members, may be convened
by the Central Government or the Director-General or by any officer empowered
in this behalf by warrant of the Director-General and has the power to try any
person subject to this Act for any offence punishable thereunder and to pass
any sentence authorised thereby. A Petty
Security Force Court may be convened by an officer having power to convene a
General Security Force Court or by an officer empowered in this behalf by
warrant or any such officer and has power to try any person subject to this Act
other than an officer or subordinate officer for any offence made punishable
thereunder and to pass any sentence not exceeding two years.. A Petty Security Force Court shall consist of
not less than three officers each of whom has held the post of Deputy
Superintendent of Police for not less than two whole years. A Summary Security Force Court may be held by
the Commandant of any unit of the Force and he alone shall constitute the
Court. The findings and sentences of
General Security Force Courts may be confirmed by the Sector Director General BSF,
Kolkatta. Any person subject to this Act
who considers himself aggrieved by a finding or sentence of any Security Force
Court which has been confirmed, may present a petition to the Central
Government, the Director-General, or any prescribed officer superior in command
to the one who confirmed such finding or sentence, and the Central Government,
the Director-General at Delhi, or the prescribed officer, as the case may be,
may pass such order thereon as it or he thinks fit.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE ARMED FORCES
On the issue as to whether members of the armed
forces can absolutely exercise and enforce their fundamental rights against the
state, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in MANU/SC/0047/1963 : AIR
1965 SC 247 : (1964) 5 SCR 931 Ram Sarup vs. UOI & Anr. held that Article
33 of the Constitution of India expressly empowers the Parliament to determine
by law the extent to which any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution,
in their application, inter alia, to the members of the armed forces, shall be
restricted or abrogated to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the
maintenance of discipline among them. The Parliament can therefore, in exercise
of powers conferred by Article 33 of the Constitution of India restrict or
abrogate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution
in their application to the members of the armed forces. Such restriction or
abrogation is dependent on specific parliamentary legislation and only law
passed by resort to Article 33 can overshadow the rights guaranteed by Articles
21 and 22 of the Constitution of India.
Placing reliance on these principles laid down
by the Constitution Bench, in the subsequent pronouncement reported at
MANU/SC/0233/1982 : AIR 1982 SC 1413 : (1982) 3 SCC 140 Lt. Col. Prithi Pal
Singh Bedi vs. UOI & Ors., it was held that every provision of the Army Act
enacted by the Parliament, if in conflict with the fundamental rights conferred
by Part III, shall have to be read subject to Article 33 as having been enacted
with a view to either restricting or abrogating other fundamental rights to the
extent of inconsistency or repugnancy between Part III of the Constitution and
the Army Act. The Court rejected the submission that the law which prescribed
procedure for trial of offences by Court Martial must satisfy the requirement
of Article 21 because the procedure is prescribed by law and if it stands in
derogation of Article 21, to that extent Article 21 in its application to the
armed forces is modified by enactment of the procedure in the Army Act itself.
These principles have been reiterated in (2003) 9 SCC 630 UOI & Ors. vs.
Ex.Flt. Lt. G.S. Bajwa.
So far as the rights of members of security
forces as the Border Security Force and the permissibility and scope of
challenge to the proceedings of the security force courts by way of proceedings
under Article 226 are concerned, the Division Bench of the Guwahati High Court
had occasion to consider the same in the pronouncement reported at
MANU/GH/0170/2007 : (2007) 1 GLT 903 Director General, Border Security Force
vs. Iboton Singh (KL). In para 14 & 15, it was held as follows:-
"14. While considering the scope of
judicial review by the High Court in matters of the proceedings of a trial by a
SFC, what is also pertinent to note is that Article 33 of the Constitution has
conferred, on Parliament, the power to abridge the fundamental rights of not
only armed forces, but also of the forces entrusted with the maintenance of
public order. This, however, does not mean that merely because of the fact that
a person belongs to an armed force or a force entrusted with the maintenance of
public order, he is denuded of the constitutional guarantees given to him by
Article 21 of the Constitution, which ensures to every person a fair trial in
accordance with law. Viewed from this angle, it is clear that when the procedures
prescribed are followed as a mere formality by a SFC and not in substance or in
its true spirit, the accused may, in an appropriate case, be held to have been
denied a fair trial and such a proceeding may warrant interference by the High
Court in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. The
procedure prescribed adopted for trial by a SFC has to be tested on the
touchstone of Article 21 and if the procedural safeguards given to a person
from the Border Security Force, under the BSF Act and/or the BSF Rules, are
violated, violation thereof would, in substance, be denial of the right to a
fair trial. A person, even when he comes from the BSF, is as much a citizen as
any other citizen of India and he is entitled to all such protections as have
been given to him by making various laws in conformity with the provisions of
Article 21. The Constitution-makers were conscious of the fact that no more
restriction should be placed than what are necessary and indispensable for
ensuring maintenance of discipline and proper discharge" of duties by the
armed forces and the forces entrusted-with the maintenance of public order.
Hence, when an Indian citizen, being a member of any such forces, is tried
under its own established mechanism, such as, SFC, on a charge of having
committed the civil offence of 'murder' punishable under Section 320 IPC, it is
the duty of the High Court to examine, when such a person approaches the High
Court with an application under Article 226, to determine if, while holding the
trial, the provisions of the BSF Act and the Rules made thereunder, which
provide protection to the accused, have been adhered to or not and whether, for
the purpose of reaching its findings, the SFC has kept itself informed of all
the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and the Indian Penal Code.
It is for the reasons indicated above
that in Union of India v. LT Ballam Singh reported in MANU/SC/0360/2002 :
2002(81)ECC236 , the Apex Court has pointed out that even an army personnel is
entitled to the protection, which the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act (in short, 'the NDPS Act') gives to any other person. In other
words, the protection available, in the form of Sections 42 and 50 of the NDPS
Act, shall be applicable to the case of even an army personnel, for, there is
nothing, in the law, that the protection, given in the NDPS Act, are not
applicable to the members of the armed forces. Logically, therefore, when the
Evidence Act is applicable to the proceedings of a trial by a SFC, it is but
natural to interfere, and, in fact, we have no hesitation in holding, that if
the provisions of the Evidence Act are ignored or are not taken into account by
a SGFC and/or when the provisions of the Indian Penal Code are not properly
applied, such noncompliance may, in an appropriate case, compel the writ Court
to interfere, in exercise of its powers under Article 266, with the findings,
which may have been reached by either ignoring, or in ignorance of, the
relevant provisions of law, particularly, when such non-compliance results in
gross miscarriage of justice. This apart, and as already indicated above, the
procedural safeguards, which the BSF Act and the Rules themselves provide,
cannot be ignored, for, ignoring them may amount to, in a given case, denial of
a fair procedure to a person accused of having committed offence under the
Indian Penal Code."
It is trite that so far as the procedure for
disciplinary action, trials and punishment in respect of personnel of the armed
forces, para military forces and security forces is concerned, the provisions
of the various special statutes enacted for the purpose is fair procedure
within the meaning of the expression for the purposes of ensuring the
constitutional guarantees. Deprivation of livelihood, an essential concomitant
of the right to life by way of any proceedings has to be by a procedure which
is fair, just and reasonable. In view of the principles laid down in the afore noticed
judicial pronouncements, strict compliance with the statutory prescription,
rules and regulations in this behalf as well as with principles of natural
justice to the extent stipulated is therefore essential.
Even though the legal position of
administrative action against a person employed on a civilian post may not bind
the present consideration, however, the principles on the importance of due
process, as laid down by the Supreme Court, may be usefully referred to. The
domestic disciplinary inquiry is primarily a managerial function. The Apex
Court has held that a domestic tribunal holding an inquiry has to abide by
rules which apply in this behalf without being unduly influenced by the strict
rules of evidence and procedural law. As noticed hereafter, the position under
the BSF Act is different.
Even in a domestic inquiry, there may be very
serious charges and an adverse verdict may result in stigmatizing the
delinquent and jeopardizing his future prospects. Certainly, civil and
pecuniary consequences may enure and his reputation and livelihood included in
his right to life would be at stake. The observations of the Supreme Court in
(1986) 3 SCC 454 Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan have a bearing on the
present case and may usefully be extracted. The same reads as follows:-
"16. It has been observed by this
Court in Suresh Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal (1971) ILLJ 293 SC
that charges involving consequences of termination of service must be specific,
though a departmental enquiry is not like a criminal trial as was noted by this
Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao (1964) IILLJ
150 SC and as such there is no such rule that an offence is not established
unless it is proved beyond doubt. But a departmental enquiry entailing
consequences like loss of job which now-a-days means loss of livelihood, there
must be fair play in action, in respect of an order involving adverse or penal
consequences against an employee, there must be investigations to the charges
consistent with the requirement of the situation in accordance with the
principles of natural justice in so far as these are applicable in a particular
situation.
17. The application of those principles
of natural justice must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and
the subject matter of the case. It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules
as to which principle of natural justice is to be applied. There is no such
thing as technical natural justice. The requirements of natural justice depend
upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the
rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject matter to be dealt with
and so on. Concept of fair play in action which is the basis of natural justice
must depend upon the particular lis between the parties. (See K.L. Tripathi v.
State Bank of India and Ors. : (1984) ILLJ 2 SC ) Rules and practices are
constantly developing to ensure fairness in the making of decisions which
affect people in their daily lives and livelihood. Without such fairness
democratic governments cannot exist. Beyond all rules and procedures that is
the sine qua non."
It is noteworthy that just as disciplinary
enquiries, the security force courts are presided over by the establishment
personnel only.
The material placed before both is produced
departmentally. In this behalf, it would
be useful to consider the statutory position with regard to persons subjected
to the Border Security Force. Section 70 of the Border Security Force Act, 1968
(BSF Act hereafter) provides the constitution of a Summary Security Force Court
(`SSFC' hereafter). It is permitted under Section 74 to try any offence
punishable under the Act subject to certain stipulated exceptions. Sub-section
4 of Section 74 empowers the SSFC to pass any sentence which may be passed
under the Act except the sentence of death or of imprisonment for a term
exceeding the limit specified in sub-section 5. Sub section 5 of Section 74
limits the power of the SSFC so far as the period of the sentence of
imprisonment which may be imposed upto a period of one year if the officer
holding the SSFC has held the post of superintendent of police or a post
declared by the Central Government by notification to be equivalent thereto of
not less than three years or holds a post of a higher rank, or either of the
said post. In any case, the sub section restricts the power of Summary Security
Force Court to impose punishment to the extent of three years.
So far as the scale of punishments which are
awardable by a Security Force Court is concerned, the same are prescribed under
Section 48 of the BSF Act, 1968 which reads as follows:-
48.(1) Punishments may be inflicted in
respect of offences committed by persons subject to this Act and convicted by
Security Force Courts according to the scale following, that is to say:-
(a) death;
(b) Imprisonment which may be for the
term of life or any other lesser term but excluding imprisonment for a term not
exceeding three months in Force custody,
(c) dismissal from the service;
(d) imprisonment for a term not exceeding
three months in Force custody;
(e) reduction to the ranks or to a lower
rank or grade or place in this list of their rank in the case of an
under-officer;
(f) forfeiture of seniority of rank and
forfeiture of all or any part of the service for the purpose of promotion;
(g) forfeiture of service for the purpose
of increased pay, pension or any other prescribed purpose;
(h) fine, in respect of civil offences;
(i) severe reprimand or reprimand except
in the case of persons below the rank of an underofficer;
(j) forfeiture of pay and allowances for
a period not exceeding three months for an offence committed on active duty;
(k) forfeiture in the case of person
sentenced to dismissal from the service of all arrears of pay and allowances
and other public money due to him at the time of such dismissal;
Punishments awardable by S e c u r i t y
Force Courts BSF ACT 27
(l) stoppage of pay and allowances until
any proved loss or damage occasioned by the offence for which he is convicted
is made good.
(2) Each of the punishments specified in
sub- section (1) shall be deemed to be inferior in degree to every punishment
preceding it in the above scale."
The above gradation makes it apparent that the
dismissal from service is considered less severe than imprisonment for a term
exceeding three months. It is also evident that the security force courts wield
tremendous power so far as persons governed by the BSF Act are concerned.
Though the disciplinary enquiries do not
culminate in imposition of severest sentences of death or imprisonment, the
security force court is statutorily empowered under section 48 of the BSF Act
to award such punishments. Certainly, extremely valuable rights of the charged
person may be impacted by the punishments which are imposed which may range
from the severe penalty of dismissal to forfeiture of pay under the applicable rules.
As a result of the penalty, thus a charged person may lose his only means of
income. As noticed above, the right to livelihood is an essential part of the
right to life. Thus, procedural fairness in matters that may result in loss of
means of livelihood becomes essential.
The instant case relates to trial for
commission of offences under Section 26 & 40 of the BSF Act, 1968 and trial
by Summary Security Force Court (`SSFC'). The commission of an offence under
Section 26 of the BSF Act, 1968 is punishable by imprisonment extending upto
six months or such lesser punishment as is prescribed under the Act. Section
48(c) and thereafter of the statute prescribe dismissal, punishment of
reduction of rank and the other punishments set out hereinabove.
For commission of the offence under Section 40,
the statute prescribes imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years
or such less punishment as mentioned in the Act.
It is noteworthy that Section 70 of the BSF Act
provides that the commandant of any unit shall hold the SSFC.
An SSFC is statutorily provided and the
procedure which is to be followed by it is statutorily prescripted under Rules
133 to 161 of Chapter XI of the BSF Rules, 1969. Essential procedural
safeguards have been statutorily provided so as to ensure fairness of the
procedure which is adopted and obviate arbitrariness in the proceedings.
46. The statutory scheme clearly sets out the
legislative intent so far as the defence of a personnel covered under the
Border Security Force Act is concerned. To facilitate defence of the accused
before the courts, the statute provides for a defending officer, friend of
accused and counsel at different places. Apart from a trial by the SSFC,
Section 64 of the BSF Act provides for General Security Force Courts and Petty
Security Force Courts as well which are constituted under sections 65 and 66 of
the Act. In view of the issues relating to adequate opportunity to defend the
charges raised before this court, reference requires to be made to Rule 122 and
123 which applies to the General or Petty Security Force Courts and reads as
follows:-
"122. Defending Officer, Friend of
Accused and Counsel:- (1) At any General or Petty Security Force Court an
accused person may be represented by a counsel or by any officer subject to the
Act who shall be called "the defending officer" or assisted by any
person whose services he may be able to procure and who shall be called
"the friend of the accused". (2) The defending officer shall have the
same rights and duties as appertain to a counsel under these rules and shall be
under the like obligations. (R.63).
(3) The friend of the accused may advise
the accused on all points and suggest the questions to be put to the witnesses,
but he shall not examine or cross-examine the witnesses or address the Court.
123. Requirement for Appearance of
Counsel
- (1) An accused person intending to be
represented by a counsel shall give to his Commandant or to the convening
officer the earliest practicable notice of such intention, and, if no
sufficient notice has been given, the Court may, if it thinks fit, on the
application of the prosecutor, adjourn to enable him to obtain a counsel on
behalf of the prosecutor at the trial.
(2) Where the convening officer so
directs, counsel may appear alongwith the prosecutor, but in that case, unless
the notice referred to in sub- rule (1) has been given by the accused, notice
of the direction for counsel to appear shall be given to the accused at such
time (not in any case less than seven days) before the trial as would, in the
opinion of the Court, has enabled the accused to obtain counsel to assist him
at the trial. (3) The counsel, who appears before a Court of behalf of the
prosecutor or accused, shall have the same rights as the prosecutor or accused
for whom he appears to call, and orally examine, cross- examine, and re-examine
witnesses, to put in any plea, and to inspect the proceedings and shall have
the right other wise to act in the course of the trial in place of the person on
whose behalf he appears, and he shall comply with these rules himself to do any
of the aforesaid matters except as regards the statement allowed by sub-rule
(3) of rule 93 and sub-rule (4) of rule 101 or except so far as the Court
permits him so to do.
(4) When counsel appears on behalf of the
prosecutor, the prosecutor if called as witness, may be examined and
re-examined as any other witness."
It is apparent from the above that in these
proceedings, an accused person has a right to be represented by a counsel or
any officer of the BSF who shall be called the "defending officer".
In the alternative the accused person may be assisted by any person whose
services he may be able to procure who shall be called the "friend of the
accused". The manner in which a counsel is to be requested for and
appointed is stipulated under rule 123. Sub rule 3 of rule 123 provides that
such counsel would have the same rights as the prosecutor or accused for whom
he appears to call, and orally examine, cross-examine and re-examine witnesses
etc. Rule 122 (2) confers the same rights on the defending officer.
It is noteworthy that so far as the
"friend of accused" is concerned, he has no right of audience and
under sub rule 3 of rule 122 is only authorised to advise the accused on all
points and suggest the questions to be put to the witnesses, but shall not
examine or cross-examine the witnesses or address the court.
So far as trial of a person by the SSFC is
concerned, rule 157 of the BSF Rules, 1969 provides as follows:-
"157. Friend of the accused.- During
a trial at a Summary Security Force Court an accused may take the assistance of
any person, including a legal practitioner as he may consider necessary.
Provided that such person shall not examine or cross-examine witnesses or
address the Court."
Rule 157 therefore permits an accused person
who is arraigned to stand trial before the summary security force court, to
take the assistance of any person during the trial who does not have right of
audience before the court. The rule specifically enables the accused person to
take the assistance of a legal practitioner during the SSFC.
Such person is not permitted right to examine
or cross-examine witnesses or address the court. Unlike rule 122(1), rule 157
does not specifically state that such person would be called friend of the
accused. However, the very rule 157 is captioned as "Friend of the
accused" and the powers conferred under this rule are identical to those
of the friend of the accused under Rule 122.
Several protections of the rights of a charged
person have been laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1983 SC 109 Board of
Trustees of the Port of Bombay Vs. Dilipkumar Raghuvendra Nadkarni & Ors.
wherein the procedure to be followed by the authorities conducting a
disciplinary enquiry have been underlined. As noticed above, the principles
laid down by the court with regard to an adequate opportunity to defend the
charges in a domestic inquiry laid down by the Supreme Court do not strictly
apply to a person arraigned to stand trial before a security force court. But
the importance given by the courts to ensure due process, especially
representation by legal counsel, even in such disciplinary proceedings cannot
be sufficiently emphasised. In para 10 of the judgment, the court held as
follows:-
"10. Even in a domestic enquiry
there can be very serious charges and adverse verdict may completely destroy
the future of the delinquent employee. The adverse verdict may so stigmatize
him that his future would be bleak and his reputation and livelihood would be
at stake. Such an enquiry is generally treated as a managerial function and the
Enquiry Officer is more often a man of the establishment. Ordinarily he
combines the role of a Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officer and an Enquiry
Officer a Judge and a prosecutor rolled into one. In the past it could be said
that there was an informal atmosphere before such a domestic tribunal and that
strict rules of evidence and pitfalls of procedural law did not hamstring the
enquiry by such a domestic tribunal. We have moved far away from this stage.
The situation is where the employer has on his payrolls labour officers, legal
advisers lawyers in the garb of employees and they are appointed
Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officers and the delinquent employee pitted against
such legally trained personnel has to defend himself. Now if the rules
prescribed for such an enquiry did not place an embargo on the right to the
delinquent employee to be represented by a legal practitioner, the matter would
be in the discretion of the Enquiry Officer whether looking to the nature of
charges, the type of evidence and complex or simple issues that may arise in
the course of enquiry, the delinquent employee in order to afford a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself should be permitted to appear through a legal
practitioner. Why do we say so? Let us recall the nature of enquiry, who held
it, where it is held and what is the atmosphere?
Domestic enquiry is claimed to be a
managerial function. A man of the establishment dons the robe of a Judge. It is
held in the establishment office or a part of it. Can it even be compared to
the adjudication by an impartial arbitrator or a court presided over by an
unbiased judge. The enquiry officer combines the judge and prosecutor rolled
into one. Witnesses are generally employees of the employer who directs an
enquiry into misconduct. This is sufficient to raise serious apprehensions. Add
to this uneven scales, the weight of legally trained minds on behalf of
employer simultaneously denying that opportunity to delinquent employee. The
weighted scales and tilted balance can only be partly restored if the
delinquent is given the same legal assistance as the employer enjoys. Justice
must not only be done but must seem to be done is not an euphemism for courts
alone, it applies with equal vigour and rigour to all those who must be
responsible for fair play in action. And a quasi- judicial tribunal cannot view
the matter with equanimity on inequality of representation. This Court in M. H.
Hoscot v. State of Maharashtra : 1978CriLJ1678 clearly ruled that in criminal
trial where prosecution is in the hands of public prosecutor, accused, for
adequate representation, must have legal aid at State cost. This will apply
mutatis mutandis to the present situation."
The proceedings before the Security Force Court
deserve to be treated even more seriously in as much as the person concerned
may not only lose his source of livelihood, but he may be deprived of his
personal liberty and sentenced to imprisonment. Therefore, the respondents must
strictly abide by the statutory safeguards while conducting the proceedings of
the security force courts.
The issue which would require to be addressed
is as to what is the nature of assistance which the friend appointed under Rule
157 is to render to the accused person who is standing trial before the SSFC.
The expression assistance is not statutorily defined.
It is noteworthy that Section 8(e) of the
Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1974
prohibits entitlement of a detenue to a legal practitioner from appearance
before the advisory board. However, keeping in view the fact that the detention
of a citizen under the enactment is a serious and severe invasion of his
fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has read into Section 8(e) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, an
entitlement of a detenue to make a request for legal assistance to the advisory
board which is bound to consider such a request as and when made. The Supreme
Court has considered that in order to ensure that the power of preventive
detention is not used indiscriminately to settle scores or to short- circuit
the process of investigation and trial of an alleged reference. (Ref: AIR 2008
SC 2528 State of Maharashtra vs. Zubir Haji Qasim).
The propriety of legal assistance for the
detenue, its nature and sufficiency despite the statutory provision has thus
been read into proceedings before the advisory board and the right of the
detenue to make a request to it for the same has been provided as a safeguard
to ensure that his rights are protected. The consideration of this issue in
several judicial precedents would shed valuable light on the interpretation of
the expression 'friend of the accused' in respect of a person who has been
arraigned to stand trial before the SSFC.
On this issue in para 94 of the landmark
judgment of the Supreme Court reported at (1982) 1 SCC 271 A.K. Roy Vs. Union
of India & Ors.,in the context of detention under the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act, 1971 and the National Security Act, the court held as
follows:-
"94. Another aspect of this matter
which needs to be mentioned is that the embargo on the appearance of legal
practitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the detenu from being
aided or assisted by a friend who, in truth and substance, is not a legal
practitioner. Every person whose interests are adversely affected as a result
of the proceedings which have a serious import, is entitled to be heard in
those proceedings and be assisted by a friend. A detenu, taken straight from
his cell to the Board's room, may lack the ease and composure to present his
point of view. He may be "tonguetied, nervous, confused or wanting in
intelligence", (see Pelt v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd.) [1969] 1
Q.B. 125, and if justice to be done, he must at least have the help of a friend
who can assist him to give coherence to his stray and wandering ideas.
Incarceration makes a man and his thoughts dishevelled. Just as a person who is
dumb is entitled, as he must, to be represented by a person who has speech,
even so, a person who finds himself unable to present his own case is entitled
to take the aid and advice of a person who is better situated to appreciate the
facts of the case and the language of the law. It may be that denial of legal
representation is not denial of natural justice per se, and therefore, if a statute
excludes that facility expressly, it would not be open to the tribunal to allow
it. Fairness, as said by Lord Denning M.R., in Maynard v. Osmond [1977] 1 Q.B.
240, 253 can be obtained without legal representation. But, it is not fair, and
the statute does not exclude that right, that the detenu should not even be
allowed to take the aid of a friend. Whenever demanded, the Advisory Boards
must grant that facility."
Placing reliance on the above pronouncement, so
far as the meaning of the expression 'friend of accused' is concerned, in the
pronouncement of the Apex Court reported at (1988) 1 SCC 116 Johney D'Couto Vs.
State of Tamil Nadu, the court ruled on the nature of the assistance rendered
by such friend in the following terms:-
"6. The rule in A.K. Roy's case
(supra) made it clear that the detenu was entitled to the assistance of a
'friend'. The word 'friend' used there was obviously not intended to carry the
meaning of the term in common parlance. One of the meanings of the word
'friend' according to the Collins English Dictionary is "an ally in a
fight or cause; supporter".
The term 'friend' used in the judgments
of this Court was more in this sense than meaning a person known well to
another and regarded with liking, affection and loyalty. A person not being a
friend in the normal sense could be picked up for rendering assistance within
the frame of the law as settled by this Court. The Advisory Board has, of
course, to be careful in permitting assistance of a friend in order to ensure
due observance of the policy of law that a detenu is not entitled to
representation through a lawyer. As has been indicated by this Court, what
cannot be permitted directly should not be allowed to be done in an indirect
way. Sundararajan, in this view of the matter, was perhaps a friend prepared to
assist the detenu before the Advisory Board and the refusal of such assistance
to the appellant was not justified. It is not for this Court to examine and
assess what prejudice has been caused to the appellant on account of such
denial. This Court has reiterated the position that matters relating to
preventive detention are strict proceedings and warrant full compliance with
the requirements of law."
Adequacy of the procedure which meets the tests
of Article 21 & 33 mandates that no one shall be deprived of his life and
liberty except of the procedure prescribed by law. The provisions for
appointment of a competent defence officer and friend of accused have been
incorporated in the statute to ensure such fairness. Fair play in action would
be essential and the accused person before the SSFC would be entitled to a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
In view of the mandate of Rule 157, such
charged person is entitled to have the assistance of even a legal practitioner.
It is obvious that such legally trained mind would provide valuable inputs and
advice to the person standing trial to not only with regard to the applicable
legal position but also analysis of the factual matrix and assimilation of the
available evidence. He would guide the direction, manner and extent of the
cross-examination and could ensure that the accused person is able to see that
his defence is not compromised in any manner.
Investigation into an offence and summary
dismissal of the case has been provided under Chapter VII of the BSF Rules.
Rule 43 requires that where it is alleged that a person subject to the Act has
committed an offence punishable thereunder, the allegation shall be reduced to
writing in the prescribed form. Thereafter, under sub-rule 1 of rule 45, if the
person charged is an enrolled person, the company Commandant is required to
give the person concerned an opportunity of hearing. In these proceedings, the
charge and the statement of witnesses is read over to the accused. If written
statements are not available, the Commandant shall hear as many witnesses as he
may consider essential to enable him to determine the issue. The accused person
is required to be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to
make a statement. Under sub-rule 2 of rule 45, after hearing the charges, the
Commandant may award such punishment to the accused which he is empowered to
award; or dismiss the charge; or remand the accused, for preparing a record of
evidence or for preparation of an record of evidence against him or remand him
for trial by a SSFC.
Rule 48 prescribes the manner in which the
record of evidence is to be prepared by a commandant or an officer detailed by
him to do so. Such delegatee is also a member of the force or establishment. It
is natural human conduct that a commandant who is delegating his power of
recording of the evidence would normally do so to a like minded person.
Sub-rule (2) of Rule 48 prescribes that the
statement of witnesses would be recorded in the presence of the accused who
shall have the right to cross examine all those witnesses who give evidence
against him. Under sub-rule (3), after examination of all the witnesses, the
accused person is liable to be cautioned and thereafter his statement is
required to be taken down in writing. So far as the caution which is required
to be given to the accused person, the same is prescribed under sub-rule (3)
whereby the officer recording the evidence is required to inform the accused of
the options available to him as to whether to make a statement or not. The
accused is required to be informed that such statement as made by him, would be
taken in writing and may be used as evidence against him. Only thereafter
statement if any, made by him is to be taken down in writing.
The above narration would show that substantial
statutory power and discretion is conferred on the officer recording the
evidence which would enable him to give a particular slant to the evidence and
the statements which he was recording or abstracting. There is sufficient
opportunity also to influence and impact the statement and conduct of an
accused person on the part of officer so detailed in view of the explanations
and cautions he has to administer to him.
Once completed, the record of evidence is
required to placed before the Commandant. Under Rule 51, upon going through the
record of evidence, the Commandant is empowered to inter alia dismiss the
charges; or rehear the charge and award one of the summary punishments; or try
the accused by a Summary Security Force Court; or apply to a competent officer
or authority to convene a court for the trial of the accused. As per the
statutory scheme, substantial discretion is conferred on the Commandant under
Section 70 even to take a final decision based on such record of evidence. The
record of evidence, preparation whereof may be directed, is therefore of
tremendous importance.
So far as the trial is concerned, the
commandant of any unit alone is empowered to conduct the Summary Security Force
Court ('SSFC' hereafter) under Section 70 of the Act.
It is important to note that the officer
recording the record of evidence was not the authority who was to adjudicate
upon the innocence or guilt of the petitioner with regard to the offence with
which he was charged. However, it would still be wrong to undermine the
significance and the role of the officer recording the evidence, merely because
the role of preparing record of evidence is not on the same platform as that of
a decision making authority. The nature of task entrusted upon such officer and
its relevance in the decision making process in any disciplinary proceedings cannot
be overlooked.
Therefore, even though the officer who prepares
the record of evidence is not an adjudicator or the judge in the matter,
however, he occupies a valuable position, as his manner of preparing the record
of evidence, and noticing the statements and observations are significant
enough to be able to influence the result of the consideration by the
commandant merely by the manner in he which he records the record of evidence
and his approach in recording the same.
As already noticed above, right to livelihood
is an essential part of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The
importance of the permissible assistance to an accused person before th e
security force court is underlined by the statutory prescriptions. Failure to
grant such opportunity would result in essentials of not only the principles of
natural justice being violated but under the given statutory provisions, is a
breach of the requirement of Rule 157. It tantamounts to denial of a fair
opportunity of representation in the trial leading to procedural unfairness.
The persons of armed forces cannot be denied of
the rights provided for in the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court has once
again upheld the same in 2007 (7) SCALE 53 Sheel Kr. Roy Vs. Secretary M/o
Defence & Ors. and stated thus:-
21 ........ It is now a well settled
legal principle which has firmly been accepted throughout the world that a
person merely by joining Armed Forces does not cease to be a citizen or be
deprived of his human or constitutional right. This aspect of the matter has
been considered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Nirmal Lakra Vs.
Union of India & Ors. reported in 2003 (1) SLJ 151.
It is often argued that disciplinary
proceedings being quasi judicial in nature attract the principles of natural
justice as the order in the proceeding involves civil consequences. Th Apex
Court in a catena of judgments has held that the deprivation of livelihood by
an order of dismissal has to be just, fair and reasonable. As such the
requirements of natural justice cannot be denied to any one. Thus, the
appointment and actual assistance of a defending officer or a friend becomes
inevitable.
The observations of the Apex Court on the issue
as to whether the fundamental right to legal aid could be denied to an
appellant merely because he did not apply for legal aid, throw valuable light
on the issue as to whether the alleged refusal of the petitioner to appointment
of a defence assistance could justify the conduct of the respondent in
thrusting Sh. Bhatti as the friend of the accused on the petitioner. In its
judgment reported at AIR 1986 SC 991 Suk Das vs. Union Territory of Arunachal
Pradesh, so far as awareness of rights of the persons are concerned, the Apex
Court observed as follows :-
"6. But the question is whether this
fundamental right could lawfully be denied to the appellant if he did not apply
for free legal aid. Is the exercise of this fundamental right conditioned upon
the accused applying for free legal assistance so that if he does not make an
application for free legal assistance the trial may lawfully proceed without
adequate legal representation being afforded to him? Now it is common knowledge
that about 70% of the people living in rural areas are illiterate and even more
than that percentage of the people are not aware of the rights conferred upon
them by law. Even literate people do not know what are their rights and
entitlements under the law. It is this absence of legal awareness which is
responsible for the deception, exploitation and deprivation of rights and
benefits from which the poor suffer in this land. Their legal needs always
stand to become crisis oriented because their ignorance prevents them from
anticipating legal troubles and approaching a lawyer for consultation and
advise in time and their poverty magnifies the impact of the legal troubles and
difficulties when they come. Moreover, because of their ignorance and
illiteracy, they cannot become self-reliant: they cannot even help themselves.
The law ceases to be their protector because they do not know that they are
entitled to the protection of the law and they can avail of the legal service
programme for putting an end to their exploitation and winning their rights.
The result is that poverty becomes with them a condition of total helplessness.
This miserable condition in which the poor finds themselves can be alleviating
to some extent by creating legal awareness amongst the poor. That is why it has
always been recognised as one of the principal items of the programme of the
legal aid movement in the country to promote legal literacy. It would in these
circumstances make a mockery of legal aid if it were to be left to a poor
ignorant and illiterate accused to ask for free legal services. Legal aid would
become merely a paper promise and it would fail of its purpose."
It is settled that the right to legal aid and
speedy trial are part of the guarantee of human rights envisaged by Article 21
of the Constitution of India (Ref.: AIR 1991 SC 1 State of Maharashtra Vs. M.P.
Vaish; MANU/SC/0119/1978 : 1978 Crl. L. J. 1678 M.H. Hoskot Vs. State of
Maharashtra; 1991 Crl.L. J. 2717 A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr.)
In view of the restricted right of members of
the armed forces and paramilitary forces and abrogation of an absolute right to
legal assistance which stands limited by statutory provisions especially during
the trials by court martials and security force courts, the rights of a person
arraigned before a special court as a court martial or the security force
courts, which are similar, assumes special importance.
The legislative intent is apparent. It
recognises the rights of the accused to contest the charges for which he is
tried and to take the assistance of any person including a legal practitioner,
who he may consider necessary.
Section 8 of the Border Security Force Act
makes the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act applicable to all proceedings
before a Summary Security Force Court.
When the statute does not provide for legal
representation or any form of assistance by a friend, the discretion lies with
the adjudicating authority. The factors that must be taken into consideration
in deciding the same are as follows: seriousness of the charge or penalty;
whether any points of law are likely to arise; the capacity of a person to
represent their own case; procedural difficulties; need for speedy decision
making and the need for fairness between the individual and the officers
concerned. When the charge is of a serious and complex nature, the request of
the delinquent to be represented through counsel or agent could be conceded.
(Ref.: (MANU/SC/0469/1993 : (1993) 2 SCC 115 Crescent Dyes & Chemicals Ltd.
Vs. Ram Naresh Tripathi)
Rule 157 has permitted engagement of a legal
practitioner as a friend of the accused. The obvious legislative intent was to
ensure that the rights of an accused person may be under adjudication by a
summary method and hence has permitted even engagement of a legal practitioner
to assist the accused persons. In this background, assistance has to be real
and meaningful. The respondents cannot get away with merely appointing just any
person for this purpose.
Even though Rule 157 of the BSF Rules prohibits
the friend of accused from examining or cross-examining witnesses or addressing
the court, however, his mandate is to assist the accused person.
It is the necessity of even-handedness that the
assistance be effective. The effective assistance by a defending officer or a
friend of the accused cannot be denied to the accused in a disciplinary
proceeding. The Apex Court in (2008) 4 SCC 1 Union of India & Ors. Vs.
Naman Singh Sekhawat recognizing the need for effective assistance held thus:-
"19. In the departmental proceedings
the appellant was bound to comply with the principles of natural justice.
Copies of some documents were not supplied. Services of a legal practitioner,
may not be a matter of right, but he was atleast entitled to the effective
assistance of the departmental representative, Shri Madhukar Sharma. The same
was also for all intent and purport denied."
The assistance which is to be afforded to an
accused person is not only required to be adequate but it has to be meaningful.
A person who is so appointed has to be fit to render legally permissible
assistance to the accused so as to render his defense of the charges meaningful
and fair. An opportunity to defend cannot be defeated by not providing as a
friend of the accused, such a person who is capable of giving fair, proper and
effective assistance to the accused person. The very fact that an accused
person is permitted to seek assistance of even a legal practitioner would show
that the assistance which is to be given to the accused person in conducting his
defence is of a competent person.
The Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in
Director General, Border Security Force & Ors. Vs. Iboton Singh (Kh)
(supra) considered the scope of judicial review of the findings of the Summary
Security Force and had held as follows:-
"10. While considering the scope of
judicial review of the findings of a SFC, it also needs to be borne in mind
that a SFC is not subject to power of superintendence of the High Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Though the proceedings of the SFC
fall outside the purview of Article 227, these proceedings are nonetheless
subject to the, overall, power of judicial review by the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution. If a SFC has been properly convened, there is
no challenge to its constitution and if the procedure, which it followed, was
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the BSF Act and the BSF Rules,
the High Court would not interfere with the findings of such a Court unless the
findings reached by it are perverse, that is, when the finding reached is
wholly without any supporting evidence or wholly against the evidence. The
proceedings of a SFC are not to be compared with the proceedings of a trial, in
the ordinary criminal courts, under the Code of Criminal Procedure. A SFC
remains, to a great degree, an integral and specialized part of the overall
mechanism by which discipline is maintained in a 'force ', such as, BSF. It is
for the special needs of such a 'force' that instead of ordinary criminal
court, the offenders are tried by SFC even when the offence is punishable by
Indian Penal Code. At the same time, what cannot be ignored is that a SFC
functions as a Court to which the provisions of the Evidence Act are
applicable. The concept of relevance of admissibility of evidence, the burden
of proof, and the standard of proof, as envisaged in the Evidence Act, are
applicable, without exception, to the trial of an accused by SFC. Viewed thus,
it is clear that a SFC has the same responsibility, as any other criminal
court, to protect the rights of an accused arraigned before it and, therefore,
follow the procedural safeguards given to an accused in order to ensure that he
has a fair trial."
It was also held in this case (Director
General, Border Security Force vs. Iboton Singh (KL) (supra)) that normally an
accused person being tried has to be informed of the offence for which he is
charged with and it is to be ensured that he clearly understands the nature of
the offence for which he is being tried; the case against him be fully and
fairly explained to him and the accused be afforded effective opportunity to
defend himself providing for substantial compliance with the outward fairness
of the law. Mere mistake in procedure and mere consequential arrears of
omissions in the trial are recorded as penal by the code and the trial is not
vitiated unless the accused can show substantial prejudice caused to him.
Amongst the procedural laws on this subject, disregard of several provisions is
considered vital.
A solemn duty is cast on the Summary Security Force
Court to ensure that the valuable rights of an accused person who is charged
with an offence which may result in serious consequences are adequately
protected.
IMPORTANT HEADNOTES
Pankaj Negi vs Union Of India & Anr.
[WP 1798 of 2000, decided on 9th July, 2012] – DHC [DB] –
Allegations of cattle trespass at BOP – Held, the petitioner did
not object or raise objections regarding non compliance of the mandatory
requirement of Rule 45B. The petitioner rather cross examined the witnesses
during ROE and also deposed in support of his contentions but did not raise any
objection about non compliance of Rule 45B. The plea of the learned counsel for
the petitioner that the petitioner is not literate and did not know the intricacies
of the rules cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances. The plea
regarding non compliance of Rule 45B was also not categorically raised by the
petitioner before the Summary Security Force Court and, therefore, the plea of
the petitioner that since Rule 45B of the BSF Rules was not strictly complied
with, therefore, the findings of the Summary Security Force Court will be
vitiated cannot be accepted - As far as the sufficiency of the evidence before
the Summary Security Force Court is concerned, this Court in judicial review of
the decision of SSFC Court will not take over the function of SSFC Court as the
writ petition is not an appeal against the findings of SSFC nor can this Court
exercise or assume the role of the appellate authority. It cannot differ with
the findings of the fact arrived at by the SSFC except in the cases of
malafides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence at all to support the
finding or where the finding is such that anyone acting reasonably or with
objectivity could not have arrived at the same or where a reasonable
opportunity has not been given to the accused to defend himself or it is a case
where there has been non application of mind on the part of Summary Security
Force Court. In the present case, there was evidence before the Summary
Security Force Court, however, the sufficiency of evidence is not to be assessed
by this Court. The grounds on which the decision of the SSFC can be interfered
by judicial review are "illegality", "irrationality" and
"procedural impropriety". As far as procedural impropriety is
concerned, it has already been held that on the grounds raised by the
petitioner, this Court cannot interfere. As far as illegality or irregularity
is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to make out any
such illegality or irregularity which shall entail any interference by this
Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has rather tried to emphasize
that the evidence of the witnesses cannot be relied on as from a distance it
could not be asserted whether the cattle were bulls or cows. Such pleas as has
been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not sufficient to
conclude that the SSFC had left out relevant factors or had taken into account
irrelevant factors. In any case, it was for the petitioner to have put such
questions, as has been raised by the counsel for the petitioner now, that from
a distance it could not even be ascertained whether the cattle which had
crossed the gate were bulls or cows, to the witnesses who had appeared in the
ROE and thereafter in the Summary Security Force Court. This Court as has
already held that it will not re- appreciate the evidence on the basis of the
assumptions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner – The DB of the
DHC however felt that the punishment was excessive and disproportionate. On the
aspect of punishment it held that - With regard to the petitioner‟s plea of disproportionate punishment imposed on
him, on carefully examining the record it is clear that the charge framed
against the petitioner is only of not detecting 16 bulls crossing over to
Bangladesh from India. Also it is evident that even though the superior authority,
Inspector Murari Singh, who has deposed against the petitioner had detected the
cattle crossing the border over to Bangladesh, however, he too was unsuccessful
in retrieving the cattle. Moreover, there is nothing on the record to establish
that the petitioner was involved with any smugglers or that he had accepted any
illegal gratification for allowing the cattle to cross over the international
border or that he deliberately allowed the cattle to cross over the border, nor
is this the charge framed against him. In the circumstances, the allegations
proved against the petitioner does not warrant such an extreme punishment of
dismissal from service which has been imposed on him. Even if there was failure
on his part to detect the cattle cross over the International Border, this will
not reflect extreme negligence or dereliction of duty by him. It can hardly be
disputed that the punishment of dismissal from service is the severest
punishment that could be imposed upon an employee. For imposition of such
punishment, it should be necessary that the charge is proved and the conduct of
the employee is such that it would invite imposition of such a harsh
punishment. It is not possible to evolve a straight-jacket formula to determine
the excessiveness or otherwise of the punishment awarded, however, in the
present case it is clear that the punishment is so strikingly disproportionate,
that it demands judicial interference. The Apex Court has, however, repeatedly
held that the imposition of punishment is primarily the job of the Disciplinary
Authority and in normal circumstances even if the Tribunal or the Court comes
to a finding that the punishment imposed on a delinquent in a given case is
excessively harsh, disproportionate to the proved misconduct or is one which
shocks the conscience of the Court, it may after setting aside the said
punishment, remand back the matter to the Tribunal or to the Disciplinary
Authority for the imposition of punishment afresh. Thus, the appropriate course
of action would be to remand the matter to the respondent authorities, in order
to reconsider the quantum of punishment imposed on the petitioner – writ petition
allowed in part – sentence modified.
Rajinder Singh Hundal vs. Union
of India & Ors. [WP 8572 of 2020 decided on 1 july, 2020] – [P&H HC,
Single Judge] – Writ challenging transfer – allegation of violation of violation
of the Border Security Force (Tenure of Posting and Deputation) Rules, 2000 –
Petitioner alleged family exigency – UOI refused any violation – transfer as
per rules - posting to static formation shall be for a period of three years
only and thereafter the member of the force is to be reverted back to his
present Battalion and no person from one static formation shall be posted to
another static formation immediately after completion of one tenure. – THE COURT
HELD THAT - The petitioner a member of CAPF has been unable to point out any element
of mala-fide in his transfer, which comes out to be for administrative reason.
The transfer is an incidence of service and cannot be taken to be an act of
punishment. It is for an employer to see where he requires services of the
employee and an employee especially member of a paramilitary force supposed to
maintain strict discipline cannot dictate terms in that regard keeping his
personal interest in view rather than showing willingness to serve, where he is
posted, especially at this juncture when the country is facing hostilities by
the neighbouring countries at border. The instructions/guidelines relied upon
by the petitioner do not come to his rescue since those are for administrative convenience
and cannot be taken to have statutory force. His conduct of not asking for
terminal posting when options for transfer were taken travels against his case.
It seems that the petitioner wants to avoid going away from Chandigarh. The
family circumstances explained by him are not that compelling requiring his
immediate presence with the family for most of the time – writ petition
dismissed.
Balwinder Singh vs. Union of India & Ors.
[WP 7875 of 2007, decided on 3 June 2010] – [DHC - DB] – Held, petitioner has
been denied a reasonable facility to make his defence by not providing a proper
friend of the accused who is statutorily mandated under rule 157 as the officer
recording the ROE was appointed as the Friend – Writ allowed, Order Set Aside.
[Chanakya Legal is a Corporate Law firm based in North Bengal and specializing in 1) High Court Litigation - Writ Petition, 2) Non-Litigation - FDI - Venture capital & angel investment; business incorporation; business name registration; importing/exporting; product safety; product standards; inter-provincial trade treaties; Legal Documentation; Vetting of complex global Agreements & Contracts; review of Banking & Finance related documentation; HR & Employment issues; IP protection; Transactional & commercialization issues; Cyber & IT laws; Review of procurement, Tender & RFP documentation; MSA, SLA, SOW & Amendments thereto; Due Diligence for Mergers & Acquisitions; Shares, Debentures & IPO; and training on Legal Compliances. While, preventing you - against entering bad agreement, criminal code, consumer protection, restrictive trade practices, deceptive advertising, infringement, and passing-off.]
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